Giorgi II was a King of Georgia (between 1072 and 1089) during one of the most difficult periods in Georgian History. Giorgi's father Bagrat IV ruled Georgia for almost half a century. His mother Queen Borena was the daughter of the King of Ossetia. His grandmother Mariam, daughter of King Senekerim Artsruni of Vaspurakan, actually ruled the country during Giorgi's minority. Subsequently Mariam played a major role in the political life of Georgia. Giorgi's aunt, Queen Gurandukht too made an outstanding contribution to the formation of Giorgi as a politician. Marta, Giorgi's sister, was a Byzantine Queen, enjoying great love and respect in the Empire. Nothing is known about Giorgi's spouse. She must have been already dead by the beginning of the 12th century. Giorgi had only one son, David IV, later surnamed the Builder.
From early age Giorgi happened to be in the epicenter of political life. During Bagrat IV's sojourn in Byzantium, Liparit Baghvashi enthroned Prince Giorgi as King of Georgia. Through this act the minor Giorgi became the symbol of the country's unity. He fulfilled various charges before his father's death.
The political changes occurring in Western Asia in the 1070s-1080s had a negative impact on the life of many states. The inroads of the Seljuk Turks weakened the Byzantine Empire appreciably, several small or large state entities falling victim to these invasions. It was in this grave foreign political situation that Giorgi ascended the Georgian royal throne in 1072.
As soon as Giorgi II became King, the big feudal lords: Niania Kvabulis-dze, Ivane Liparitis-dze and Vardan, Eristavi of the Svans seceded (in 1073). Niania took Kutaisi, seizing the armory of Kutaisi Ivane enlisted the Kakhetians and occupied the Ksani river area, while Vardan stirred the Svans to rebellion and overran Saegro (Egrisi). As a result of this action, Kutaisi, the Ksani river area and Egrisi were ravaged. The Georgian royal court and Giorgi II appear to have sized up the situation properly and began to take measures to curb the secessionists. Apart from force, Giorgi II seems to have made wide use of diplomacy. Thinking of Georgia did not consider it advisable to maintain hostile relations with the big feudal lords and, although he had already brought them to submission, he decided to make certain concessions. These concessions took the shape of conferring Samshvilde to Ivane Liparitis-dze, und granting Lotsobani to Ivane's son Liparit in lieu of Rustavi; the latter city was transferred to the Kakhetians. Niania Kvabulis-dze received Tmogvi as a gift, while Vardan the Eristavi of the Svans received "Askalana and Utaghebo of the Jaqelis".
Thus, through these royal grants, peace was obtained for some time within the country. However, it did not last long. At the end of 1073 and early in 1074 Ivane Liparitis-dze again seceded from the king. Giorgi II went hurriedly from Kutaisi to Samtskhe, from where he went up to Samshvilde with Meskhian troops. Here the Kakhetian King Aghsartan came to his aid. Naturally enough, the breakaway feudal lord could not stand up to such forces and Ivane submitted to the King.
The struggle between the Georgian King and the big feudal lords found reflection in foreign policy as well. Ivane's next secession must have taken place in 1074. This time he took the town of Gagi by ruse from Giorgi II's guards, handing it over to Padlon (Fadlun) the master of Gandza, for a certain price. Ivane sought to consolidate his positions in the country by establishing relations with outside enemies.
The Georgian royal court was busy with tackling internal problems when a new wave of Seljuk Turks appeared at the country’s borders. The Sultan took Gandza, leaving Sarang (Savteng of the Arabic sources), one of his commanders, as the Governor of Aran. Upon capturing the Shaddadid state, the command of the Seljuk Turks decided to launch military operations westward - against Georgia. In the autumn of 1075, Sarang arrived in Georgia with a sizeable army. A battle took place at Partskhisi between the Turks and the Georgians, the Oghuz Turks suffering a bitter defeat.
Following the victory at the Partskhisi battle, Giorgi I annexed the fortresses held by the Byzantines in Klarjeti, Shavsheti, Javakheti and Artaani, as well as the fortress of Anakopia. A meeting was held in Tao between the Georgian King and Grigol Bakurianis-dze, the Grand Domestic of the Byzantine Empire, an ethnic Georgian. As a result of the meeting, it was officially resolved to transfer the Kingdom of Van and to Giorgi II. The aggression of the Seljuk Turks apparently induced the Empire to view Georgia not as a rival but an ally. After the disaster at Manazkert, Byzantium was doubtless in need of the loyalty of the Georgian kings, the hand-over of Anakopia, as well as of Klarjeti, Shavsheti, Javakheti, Artaani and some fortresses to Giorgi II must have taken place on the basis of a definite accord between the Empire and Georgia. Apparently, the Empire could not already keep the contingent of troops in Georgia needed to hold the fortresses here. Therefore, they began a phased withdrawal from these strongholds, transferring them to the Georgians. Thus, after 1075 Georgia regained a large of part the territories lost early in the 11th century.
The political significance of this development lay in Byzantium acknowledging Georgia as the only country in the East that could succeed to its legacy. “The Kingdom of Abkhazia” (Western Georgia) was entering the political arena as an ally and equal partner of Constantinople.
Giorgi II expanded the country's southern borders considerably. The capture of the Kari fortress was a major triumph of Georgia's foreign policy. The Seljuks naturally kept an eye on these processes and that is why the new aggression launched around this time by the normal Oghur tribes in the direction of Western Asia was largely targeted at Byzantine dominions, still surviving, in the South Caucasus and against Georgia.
David the Builder’s historian touches specially on the new campaign of the Seljuks, resulting in the nomad Oghuz becoming Georgia's immediate neighbor in the south. This must have occurred around 1077, for David's chronicler refers to the new aggression of the Turks immediately after mentioning the Georgian-Byzantine accord concluded at Bana in 1076.
At the first stage the aggression of the Seljuks did not involve the territory under the jurisdiction of the Georgian king.
At this time the Oghuz campaigns were largely directed at the dominions of the Byzantine Empire, the latter suffering tangible losses in terms of territory. Several administrative territorial units, including the Iberian theme were the first victims of this aggression. At the initial stage the Seljuks apparently aimed at invading the Georgian-Byzantine border, with the object of preventing joint military actions of the two states.
Following the final conquest of Byzantium's eastern provinces, the road to Georgia was now open. The Seljuks were well aware of the Empire's own foreign political and military difficulties, preventing it from coming to Georgia's aid. The Kingdom of Georgia was left alone face to face with an Oghuz army of many thousands.
After the capture of the eastern provinces of Byzantium, the Seljuks were now ready to attack Georgia, delivering the strike on the Kari (Kars) fortress. This is understandable, for by holding the fortress the Georgian side controlled a fairly large part of the historical Kingdom of Kari.
In 1079, conducting a large-scale military operation, the Seljuk commander Ahmad Amir succeeded in expelling the Georgian guards from the Kari fortress and capturing the city. The Georgian royal court was well aware that this was a serious loss for the country: however, Giorgi II did not take any serious military action against the Turks.
Following these developments, one might easily guess that the Georgian royal court would not leave this aggression of the Turks without a response. Therefore, Ahmad the Amir resolved to neutralize Georgia, and early in 1080 launched a powerful campaign against Georgia. There were several causes for the invasion of the Seljuk Turks: in the first place Giorgi II was actually the only real ally of Byzantium in the East, and secondly, in the South Caucasus only the Georgian royal court could offer serious resistance to the campaigns of the Turks and frustrate their aggressive plans. In the words of the historian of David the Builder, the Seljuk commander Ahmad the Amir managed to secretly penetrate deep into Georgia, defeating the Georgian king at the Qveli fortress. The chronicler notes specially that the enemy had managed to reach the camp of Giorgi II covertly through the betrayal of Christian traitors. These traitors must have been not just a couple but a whole band in opposition to the king, enjoying considerable influence in Southern Georgia and at the royal court. Ahmad the Amir could have marched the rather large distance from the Kari Kingdom to the Qveli fortress only with the help of a serious ally.
The Seljuk Turks managed to reach the king's camp covertly, attacking the Georgians unexpectedly. This proved so sudden for Giorgi II that he failed to offer proper resistance and retreated. The entire royal treasury fell into the enemy's hands, the Georgians finding shelter in the Acharan mountains.
Ahmad the Amir, triumphant at Queli fortress, turned back, loaded with spoils. Satisfied with the success, he abstained from pursuing Giorgi II further. According to David the Builder's historian, on the way home, Ahmad the Amir came across the Amirs Isa Bari and Ubu-Iagub, on their campaign against Byzantium. Ahmad told them about his victory in Georgia, informing them that the Georgian King Giorgi II had found refuge in Western Georgia. The Seljuk Turks liked Ahmad's view and, altering the direction of the campaign, marched towards Georgia.
In 1080 the wrath of the Seljuk Turks fell on Shavsheti, Achara, Samtskhe, Kartli, Argueti; the enemy took Kutaisi in one day, burning it down. At the same time, other bands of the Seljuk Turks ravaged the desert monasteries of Artanuji and Klarjeti. The invasion of the enemy lasted several months. Under these hard conditions, those who had time took shelter in relatively safe places. Part of the population of Eastern and Southern Georgia fell victim to the enemy's sword. Severe winter came on top of the rampage of the Seljuks, further aggravating the situation. The cold weather made the conditions of the population who had found refuge in the mountains unbearable. "The great Turkish conquests" started in Georgia.
This development left a very tragic imprint in Georgian history. "The great Turkish conquests" was a global political process that delayed the political and economic development of Georgia. The "great Turkish conquests" brought about a breakdown of the country's economy and trade, delay in the process of the unification, decimation of the population and mass migration from Eastern Georgia to relatively peaceful regions, the settlement of nomads on fertile lands of Kartli and Kakheti.
The Georgian people came to face a very grave threat, for the invasion of the Turks differed essentially from Byzantine and Arab domination. The Turkish nomadic economy knocked the bottom out of the Georgian feudal economy, which threatened the country with extinction. Giorgi II was aware of this heavy situation - both in Georgia and in neighboring countries and he sought a way out to save the country from ultimate devastation and destruction. The king invited the nobles and, upon consulting them, he decided to visit the Sultan Malik-Shah. This was a courageous decision, and probably the only right way out in the obtaining situation. In order to save the nation and the country Georgia had to meet all the demands of the Sultan. This was not a reckless compromise, for the kingdom of "the Abkhazians and the Georgians" did not have the power at the time to stand up alone to the Turkish Empire extending across Central and Western Asia. A glance at the international situation of the period convinces one that such a step was taken by kings and princes of other countries too. Thus, Giorgi II was no exception and his decision was dictated by the obtaining situation. Giorgi II preferred quite correctly peace to the continuation of a senseless and unequal war. This would partly improve the situation in the country, and the king was not mistaken in this.
Malik Shah's response to the diplomatic mission of the Georgian king was favorable. Giorgi II committed himself to paying a large tribute to the Sultan, which was collected and sent to the invaders for a definite period of time. In return Georgia was free from "ravagers." Besides, Malik-Shah transferred Kakheti and Hereti to Giorgi II, even assigning him troops for the annexation of Kakheti.
Returning from Malik-Shah, Giorgi II, accompanied by the Seljuk Turks, besieged the Vezhini fortress in Kakheti. In the mid-11th century Vezhini had turned into a bone of contention between Kakhet- Hereti and the Kingdom of Abkhazia. The fortress lay at the crossing of important roads. The roads to Tbilisi, Telavi and Hereti branched off at the Vezhini-Bakurtsikhe section.
The siege of Vezhini started in October, lasting for quite some time. However, for uncertain reasons, Giorgi II lifted the siege and moved to Western Georgia. This step taken by the king has long been the subject of difference of opinions among his historians. This is understandable, for it would seem from this context that Giorgi II took such a flippant view of the country's problems as to prefer hunting to the capture of the Vezhini fortress. In reality, one should assume the existence of serious political processes behind the words of the chronicler. The departure from Vezhini was an unequivocally political act, and it is wrong to put any other construction on it. Problems may have arisen after many months of contacts with the Seljuk Turks and the sudden lifting of the siege of Vezhini may have been precipitated by an aggravation of the situation in Western Georgia. It also seems fairly logical to assume that Giorgi II pictured to himself the state in Kakhetian strongholds would find themselves in following their seizure by the Seljuks. Hence, he found the only way out by abandoning the Turks and abstaining from participation in the devastation of Kakheti.
Before returning to Kutaisi, Giorgi II "gave Sujeti and the river Iori area as a gift to the Seljuk Turks." The impression is gained from David the Builder's historian that after Giorgi II's departure from the siege of the Vezhini fortress, the Turks did not continue the siege but ravaged completely the territory granted to them by the Georgian king.
The issue of Kakheti-Hereti still remained unresolved both for the Kingdom of the Abkhazians and for the Seljuk Turks. The king of the Kakhetians also saw clearly that such uncertainty could not last long and the problem would again arise. Hence, Aghsartan the King of Kakheti found a peculiar way out of the obtaining situation. As soon as the foreign menace subsided, Aghsartan tried to settle relations with the Seljuk Turks by taking an opportune step. Appearing in person before Malik-Shah, and renouncing Christianity, he succeeded in retaining Kakheti-Hereti under his own rule. Naturally, the Sultan Malik-Shah had no liking either for Giorgi II or for Aghsartan. That is why he again "gave Kakheti as a gift" to Aghsartan, having earlier presented it to Giorgi II. Thus, thanks to Malik-Shah Kakheti again remained outside Georgia, this deferring the prospects of incorporation of Kakheti-Hereti into the Kingdom of Abkhazia for a few years.
Owing to the grave foreign situation of Georgia the royal court not only rejected the incorporation of the Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti but put off for the time being the fight for the retrieval of the Zedazeni fortress.
It was at this time that a certain political group at the Georgian royal court succeeded in removing Giorgi II from active political life. True, the source says that Giorgi II himself placed the crown on his son's head, but this does not mean that this move was an expression of his own will. It should not be surprising that he acted under some coercion. Otherwise, the transfer of the Georgian king's whole power to the heir apparent would probably not have taken place. The conflict between father and son was so bitter that David the Builder considered the action against his father a great sin, recalling it on many occasions.
After David's assumption of power, the former King Giorgi II had to be removed from state administration and isolated in some way. This was in the interests of the autocratic King (David the Builder). When speaking of the coup of 1089, the present writers do not imply a military coup. In 1089, Giorgi II was removed in a velvet revolution, his nominal and symbolic function being retained. After David IV's accession Giorgi II withdrew from active political life, although he retained the title of "King of Kings".
The chronicle names 1089 as the date of the enthronement of David by Giorgi II, with no further reference to the latter. Giorgi is mentioned in the Act of the Ruis-Urbnisi Synod (1104). According to the "Chronicle of the Abkhazian Kings" Giorgi II died in 1112.
Many historians have focused on the study of the period under discussion. In the opinion of some researchers, the measures taken by Giorgi II failed to extricate Georgia from the grave situation she found herself in the 1070s-1080s. On the contrary, in some cases his moves aggravated further the domestic and foreign political situation of the century. Ail this is accounted for by Giorgi II's weakness.
The process of reevaluation of Giorgi II's reign began in Georgian historiography in the second half of the 20"h century. A number of noteworthy studies were published, in which Giorgi's rule as well as his personality are shown in a new light.
Does there exist any tangible evidence to enable historians to give Giorgi II's reign a negative assessment. To some extent there did exist premises for viewing his reign in negative light. However, in assessing the political rule of a king the discussion cannot be reduced to consideration of a couple of facts. Success and failure attend the life of every great monarch.
To charge Giorgi II with failure to carry on large-scale warfare against the Seljuk Turks is not justified. We should remember that at the first stage, when inroads of the Turks were not yet of mass character, Giorgi I succeeded not only in defeating the Oghuz at Partskhisi but even driving them out of the country of Kari. Later, the campaigns of the Sekjuk Turks assumed such mass character that the Georgian royal court indeed lacked strength to stem their onslaught. The “great Turkish conquests” has been discussed above, here it will be acted noted possess in briefly South, military that the Western resources invasion and to stand Eastern was of up to such Georgia. and mass rout Giorgi scale an II that enemy indeed the of did enemy such not numbers. States, politically and economically stronger than Georgia, failed in this.
Some historians blame Giorgi II for his failure to curb the big feudal lords. This view, too, partly stands in need of specification. To be sure, at the beginning of Giorgi's reign there took place powerful feudal rebellions, but the king managed to neutralize this political recorded crisis. Already in the early 1070s no serious feudal actions political. The other way round, Giorgi II was engaged are in the in the political process, caring for the expansion of the borders of the country.
Giorgi II happened to live at a time when the country needed a more energetic, bold monarch of initiative. Giorgi did not lack courage, but his character clearly lacked the charisma needed for the first person of the country. Giorgi was clearly inferior to his son David in other traits characteristic of the leader of a state. The strong will-power of the prince, his purposefulness instilled the politicians of the royal court with hopes of a better future; hence, in 1089 the full powers of the King of the "'Abkhazians and the Georgians" were transferred to the 16-year-old prince David IV.
Georgia's political, economic and cultural advance began.
R. Metreveli